The Russia That Never Was: What If Putin Hadn’t Invaded Ukraine? - Newsweek
On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin gave an order that irrevocably changed the fate of Ukraine. It's easy to forget that same order changed the fate of his own people, too.
In the Russia that would have existed had its troops never crossed the border, hundreds of thousands of men rotting in the soil are alive and growing older, becoming fathers or even grandfathers. Their families have one extra chair occupied at the kitchen table, and engineers, entrepreneurs and students who packed their lives into a suitcase and set off for pastures new are populating Russian companies.
It would hardly have been a paradise; there were plenty of structural issues the Kremlin was trying to solve well before the invasion. But the war has without a doubt aggravated existing weaknesses, introduced potentially devastating new ones, and swept many of the options to address them off the board.
Newsweek interviewed two specialists tasked with investigating the Russia that never was—head of economics Sergey Aleksashenko and demographer Salavat Abylkalikov of the New Eurasian Strategies Center (NEST)—to explore the human and economic future of which the Russian people have been deprived.
Like the heads of many developed nations, Putin was presiding over a country facing a notable demographic decline well before he sent his forces into Ukraine. In Russia’s case, that decline was decades in the making; famine, two world wars, and a collapse in the birth rate after the fall of the Soviet Union gouged out the population.
"Russia would most likely have continued to experience natural population decline, population aging and a shrinking number of younger cohorts," Abylkalikov told Newsweek. "But the war has accelerated them and introduced additional sources of mortality, emigration and human capital loss."
In 1999, 1.21 million children were born in Russia—some 930,000 fewer than the number of people who died that year, according to Russia’s federal statistics bureau, Rosstat. Following Putin's ascendancy to the Kremlin, this number steadily tracked upward to peak at 1.94 million in 2014—the year of Russia’s annexation of Crimea—but quickly tumbled again to around 1.22 million in 2024. The agency subsequently stopped publishing detailed demographic figures, but independent estimates suggest births fell yet again to around 1.18—1.19 million last year.
Unfortunately for Moscow, this trend looks set to continue.
"The relatively small cohorts born in the 1990s and early 2000s are now entering the main reproductive ages, Abylkalikov said.
"According to Rosstat estimates, the number of women aged 15—49 will fall from 34 million in 2025 to 31.1 million in 2035, so the number of births in Russia will continue to fall, even if the total fertility rate stabilizes," he said. "At the current level of fertility, each successive generation will be 25—30 percent smaller than that of its parents."
With a prognosis like that, Russia can hardly afford to lose more people, but that’s exactly what’s happening.
Earlier this month, an investigation by BBC News Russian and independent Russian outlet Mediazona documented 285,881 Russian soldiers killed in the so-called special military operation—an absolute bare-minimum figure for Russian losses, with verifiable, published evidence of their deaths. Broader estimates by Mediazona and the Center for Strategic and International Studies put the death toll between 275,000-350,000 by year-end 2025, and an alleged leak of private Rosstat data earlier this month pushed the toll beyond 400,000.
The age profile of those losses has changed, according to Abylkalikov .
"In the first months of the war, many of those killed were young men. In 2024—2025, the average age of deceased volunteers approached 48—50, with the largest concentration in the 46—52 age group; men who form a substantial part of the workforce in industry, energy, construction and transport."
For all the demographic devastation unfolding in the fields and trenches of eastern Ukraine, Russia has lost an even greater number of citizens not to death, but to the prospect of a new life. A 2024 investigation by The Bell, based partly on destination-country records, estimated that at least 650,000 people had emigrated from Russia since the full-scale war began.
"Young, educated and economically active people are disproportionately represented among them. Their departure means the loss of potential parents, skilled workers, entrepreneurs and taxpayers," Abylkalikov said. "Many have already started families, established professional networks and built careers abroad.
"Those who have been killed cannot be brought back, and lost reproductive potential cannot be replenished quickly."
Now, with war deaths and emigration compounding the effects of its shrinking population, Russia is struggling to replenish its workforce. Its industries still face labor shortages, particularly in agriculture, utilities and manufacturing, according to the Bank of Russia.
For decades, immigration helped Russia compensate for its declining birth rate and high mortality. Between 1992 and 2023, net migration offset nearly three-quarters of the natural population decline, Abylkalikov said. That option is no longer permissible in the Kremlin’s book.
Russia's migration policy for 2026—2030 explicitly rejects using immigration to replace the country's declining population and calls for tighter controls over the arrival and residence of foreign workers. Now, with Russia's labor force strained by all the above factors, the country is increasingly dependent on making its remaining workers more productive, yet the Kremlin continues to direct vast resources toward the war.
Russia’s draft 2027 federal budget assigns roughly 44 percent of spending to defense and security—more than double the funding allocated to social policy, health and education combined. Sky-high spending on defense since 2022 initially provided a boon for the Russian economy, but Aleksashenko says those early gains have come at a serious cost.
"The easiest way to assess the loss is through economic growth," Aleksashenko told Newsweek. "Before the war, the Bank of Russia and the Ministry of Economic Development estimated the growth potential at 3 percent. Thus, between 2022 and 2026, the Russian economy was projected to grow by 16 percent.
"Instead, it will amount to 9.3—9.5 percent. This means that over five years, the economy has lost two years of growth at full potential."
The mass diversion of resources toward the defense industry is great news for companies producing military goods and dual-use technologies, but civilian businesses have been battered by sanctions, disrupted supply chains and restrictions on access to Western industrial equipment.
It has also ramped up inflation and made borrowing more expensive; the Bank of Russia's November forecast puts the average key interest rate at 14.6 percent in 2026.
"This increases the cost of credit and reduces economic activity in civilian sectors," Aleksashenko said. "In the long term, the war will prolong a period of cooling investment activity, limiting the growth of productive capacity. Furthermore, the lack of access to modern technologies during the war and for some time after its end will cause the Russian economy to fall further behind the cutting edge of technological development."
There are some slivers of Russia's vast territory where the human consequences of the war have, quite perversely, manifested notable economic benefits for ordinary citizens.
According to Aleksashenko, Russia spends approximately 1.7—1.8 percent of GDP on contract soldiers' salaries and payments to bereaved families. By mid-2026, the minimum salary for a soldier on active duty was around 2.1 times the national average wage, and the lump sum payable to his family upon his death can reach as much as $150,000 depending on the region and applicable benefits.
"Since most contract soldiers are men from economically depressed regions, small towns, and rural areas, the money they received—or their families received after their deaths—allowed them to significantly improve their standard of living, pay off debts, buy cars, or build new homes," he said.
One wonders, though, whether those families would rather have their sons, brothers and fathers still around.
These financial windfalls are few and far between, though. NEST's October 2026 survey of a nationally representative body of Russian adults found that just 3 percent said the war had improved their household finances. By contrast, 39 percent said their financial situation had deteriorated, and three-quarters of respondents said the conflict was damaging to Russia’s economy.
Putin can still change Russia's course, but he can never take it back to the country it might have been.

