Iran’s Top Ally Has 20-Year Grudge Against Man Who May Oust Netanyahu - Newsweek

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As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wrangles to remain in power, his rival is unlikely to be welcomed by the powerful Iran-aligned group north of the border in Lebanon.

As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wrangles to remain in power, his rival is unlikely to be welcomed by the powerful Iran-aligned group north of the border in Lebanon.

Bad blood between Hezbollah and Gadi Eisenkot runs deep. The feud stems back two decades to when the veteran Israeli commander now looking to oust his country's longest-serving leader helped to establish a new blueprint for the systematic, large-scale targeting of civilian infrastructure while overseeing Israel's last war effort on Lebanese soil in 2006.

The strategy became known as the "Dahiyeh doctrine," named for the southern Beirut suburbs that serve as a stronghold for Hezbollah and home to more than a half-million people.

Yet today, one of the key architects of the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) acceleration of overwhelming, disproportionate force may represent one of the best hopes for a pivot as Israel and Hezbollah's longest and bloodiest war drags on within a three-year crisis consuming the Middle East.

"Hezbollah’s formal position is that it’s unconcerned with the Israeli election result given that it doesn’t view Eisenkot as a more moderate alternative to Netanyahu," Amal Saad, a lecturer in politics and international relations at Cardiff University in Wales and leading expert on Hezbollah, told Newsweek.

"At the same time, Hezbollah distinguishes between continuity in Israeli strategy and the political significance of Netanyahu's electoral setback. It regards both Netanyahu's difficulties and the Republicans' defeat in the American midterms as blows to leaders whose regional wars have imposed enormous costs, and as political victories for the Axis of Resistance."

That doesn't mean Eisenkot should be considered by any means soft on Hezbollah.

“Harming the population is the only means of restraining [Hassan] Nasrallah," the then-head of the IDF's Northern Command, said in 2008 in reference to the longtime Hezbollah leader.

Eisenkot rose through the ranks. He became IDF chief of staff and minister under Netanyahu before emerging as his former boss' top challenger in the election last month that left both sides scrambling to muster a majority coalition.

Nasrallah was slain in a September 2024 strike in Dahiyeh, just under a year after the Palestinian Hamas movement's surprise October 7 attack on Israel sparked a regional conflict. The Beirut raid that killed the man who for 32 years led a movement long considered Iran's oldest and most powerful Axis of Resistance ally was part of a crushing Israeli air war that surpassed even the "immense damage and destruction" Eisenkot had promised in their past confrontation.

Eisenkot has not backed down from his earlier language. He's embraced it on the campaign trail, criticizing Netanyahu at times for not going far enough in the current conflict.

"The fact that earlier this year, Eisenkot called for a repeat of this doctrine and lambasted Netayahu for being too soft, demonstrates that the difference between the two men lies less in their willingness to destroy Lebanon but in their judgment of how far Washington will let them go," Saad said. "It's true that Eisenkot opposed a preemptive war on Hezbollah in October 2023, but that was a matter of timing, not principle."

Since then, however, the core tenets of the Dahiyeh doctrine have not only been employed in Gaza and Lebanon, and to some degree Iran, Syria and Yemen as well, but broadened and escalated to degrees not witnessed in Israel's history.

Saad said that Eisenkot's signature 2006 framework had "not merely been revived but expanded in scope and intensity," and also "its purpose has been transformed from deterrence by punishment/cost imposition to facilitating occupation and making annexation/settler colonization possible."

Eran Etzion, who served as deputy head of the Israeli National Security Council during the 2006 war, argued that the Israeli approach today is hardly recognizable from the Dahiyeh doctrine era.

"It was considered far-reaching at the time in terms of its willingness to devastate and not distinguish between residential areas and clear-cut terrorist facilities and so on," Etzion, now associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, told Newsweek. "But given everything Israel has done in Gaza and in Lebanon and elsewhere in the last three years, it's like talking about World War II or something.

"Things that were considered beyond the pale are now mainstream and when you think about collateral damage and rules of engagement and efforts to protect civilians and so on, it was very much eroded and degraded in the last three years. It's not gone. The IDF is not the Russian Army or an African militia. But it's certainly not what it was a few years ago."

Newsweek has reached out to representatives of Hezbollah and the IDF for comment.

If Eisenkot should try to restrain the IDF's freedom of action, even for the sake of reviving Israel's international image, he will likely meet some institutional obstacles.

Etzion, channeling his decades of experience in various high-level Israeli government positions, recalled how "the system is sometimes, unfortunately, stronger than any person."

"The system has transformed. Things that were unimaginable three years ago are now common practice," Etzion said. "If anything, I think he's going to have to try and harness those wild horses that were allowed to essentially do whatever they want in the last three years, and that's going to be very difficult."

Eisenkot has taken a stand against alleged misconduct by IDF personnel in the past. The most notable incident came in 2016, when an Israeli soldier shot and killed a wounded, unarmed Palestinian assailant previously involved in a knife attack. Eisenkot supported punishing the Israeli soldier, while Netanyahu called for a pardon.

But when it comes to the Lebanese front, specifically, Etzion predicted that a lasting resolution could reasonably be achieved only in the event of a parallel understanding reached between Washington and Tehran.

The concept has precedent. When President Donald Trump reached an initial ceasefire agreement with the Islamic Republic in April, he declared that Israel and Hezbollah were expected to adhere to the truce as well, a position rejected by Netanyahu.

Even so, such a deal "will take a lot of effort, a lot of creativity, very difficult negotiations," Etzion said. "But I think that there is a historic opportunity here in terms of the positions of this Lebanese government."

The White House has overseen rare, direct peace talks between Israeli and Lebanese officials in an effort to sideline Hezbollah, whose government influence has waned with the election of President Joseph Aoun early last year. Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have called for Hezbollah's disarmament, though the prospect of doing so remains steeped in fears of a return to the kind of sectarian conflict that tore through the country from 1975 to 1990.

Barbara Leaf, former U.S. assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, argued that Netanyahu's primary setback on the Lebanese front was failing to pursue political gains to accompany the severe blows dealt to Hezbollah as an organization.

"That would require, of course, working with, first the U.S., but also working in an upfront, collaborative way with the Lebanese government and understanding that really fragile internal dynamic the further the Israeli Army not just goes into southern Lebanon, but what it does where it is, which is destroying villages," Leaf said in response to Newsweek's question during an event hosted Wednesday by the Middle East Institute, where she is a distinguished diplomatic fellow.

"You have the Minister of Defense [Yoav Gallant] proudly totting up the number of villages that have been razed, and taking, as he said, a Gaza approach to Lebanon," Leaf said. "That is not only a huge blow against the government in Beirut that is trying to manage this transition, to take away power from Hezbollah without getting into armed conflict, which it would be ill-suited to win, but it turns the public—which was by all accounts largely enraged that Hezbollah got back into the fight with Israel—right around again."

As the IDF continues to occupy territory and conduct order strikes across the northern border, including a series of air raids on suspected Hezbollah positions in the eastern Bekaa valley and parts of southern Lebanon in recent days, Eisenkot's own evolution over the past two decades may steer him in a direction beyond the forceful tactics he pioneered.

"Twenty years later, both Eisenkot and Israel have changed considerably," Eitan Shamir, a former head of the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs' National Security Doctrine, told Newsweek. "Eisenkot has since served as IDF chief of staff and as a member of the War Cabinet, gaining much broader experience and exposure to the military, political, and diplomatic complexities of war.

"Moreover, Israel today has a much wider spectrum of military options. Its multilayered missile defense systems, improved intelligence, precision-strike capabilities and offensive technologies allow it to respond in ways that were simply not available in 2006."

Shamir, who is today executive director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, said that Eisenkot "understands that military force must serve broader strategic objectives and that circumstances dictate the appropriate response."

Hezbollah, too, has adapted its tactics to the realities of modern warfare. The group's return to battle after the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes that opened the war on Iran in late February has witnessed the debut of fiber-optic first-person view drones to deadly, asymmetric effect against Israeli troops.

"As for Hezbollah, I believe its leadership would regard Eisenkot as someone who knows the organization well and is certainly prepared to employ substantial military force when necessary," Shamir said. "I would not expect a fundamental difference between Eisenkot and Netanyahu regarding the need to confront Hezbollah.

"The differences would more likely concern strategic priorities, the decision-making process, and the combination of military operations with diplomatic efforts."

Contact Newsweek editors on this story: Samantha Beech and Dave Siminoff.

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